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This paper employs a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of government spending on
the private sector. Our key innovation is to use changes in congressional committee chairmanship
as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures. In doing so, we show that fiscal
spending shocks appear to significantly dampen corporate sector investment and employment activity.
These corporate reactions follow both Senate and House committee chair changes, are present among
large and small firms and within large and small states, are partially reversed when the congressman
resigns, and are most pronounced among geographically-concentrated firms. The effects are economically
meaningful and the mechanism - entirely distinct from the more traditional interest rate and tax channels
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Does public sector spending complement or crowd out private sector economic activity? 
This question, which has occupied economists for much of the past century, remains a 
critical, and unresolved issue. Keynesian and neoclassical macroeconomic theories reach 
strong and generally conflicting conclusions regarding the ability of public spending to 
stimulate the private sector.  A major obstacle limiting empirical progress on the topic is 
the difficulty in identifying changes to government purchases that are truly exogenous.  
Because government behavior is influenced by developments in the private economy, 
changes in private sector investment and productivity confound the effects of government 
spending and the factors that cause that spending to change.   
This paper offers a novel empirical approach that allows us to overcome this 
challenge and shed considerable light on the impact of government spending on the 
private sector.  Our key innovation is to use changes in congressional committee 
chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures.  Since 
chairmanship is determined almost entirely by seniority — to be appointed chair a 
congressman must simply become the most senior member of the party in power on that 
committee
1 — this means that chair turnover can only result from the resignation (or 
defeat) of the incumbent, or a change in the party controlling that branch of congress.  
And because both of these events depend almost entirely on political circumstances in 
other states, ascension to chairmanship is essentially unrelated to events or conditions in 
the new chairman’s home state (e.g., a congressman will often not even be up for election 
during the year of his or her ascension).  We show that becoming a powerful committee 
chair results in a significant increase in federal funds flowing to the ascending chairman’s 
state.  Thus, a congressman’s ascension to a powerful committee chair creates a positive 
shock to his or her state’s share of federal funds that is virtually independent of the 
state’s economic conditions. 
    We focus specifically on the 232 instances over the last 42 years where the 
senator or representative of a particular state ascends to the chairmanship of a powerful 
congressional committee.  During the year that follows the appointment, the state 
                                                 
1 This use of seniority-based chairmanship has been a governing practice in both houses of Congress for 
over 100 years.  In recent years there have been occasional deviations from this rule (see Deering and 
Wahlbeck (2006)), but our results are very similar if we exclude these exceptions, or if we use changes in 
the identity of the most-senior committee member in place of changes in committee chairmanship. Powerful Politicians — Page 4 
 
 
experiences an increase of 40-50 percent in their share of federal earmark spending, and a 
9-10 percent increase in total state-level government transfers.  The funding increase 
persists throughout the chair’s tenure and is gradually reversed upon his departure.   
Because these spending shocks are sufficiently numerous, are spread out across time and 
different locations, and are economically meaningful, they provide us with significant 
power to examine the impact of fiscal policy on the private sector.
2 
To better understand our approach, consider the example of the appointment of 
Richard Shelby (Republican Senator, AL) to the chair of the Senate Select Intelligence 
Committee in 1997.  Senator Shelby had been both a congressman in the US House of 
Representatives and Senate as a Democrat from Alabama.  He switched affiliations in 
1994, and the combination of his seniority and affiliation with majority party afforded 
him the opportunity to take the chair of the Committee.  Following his appointment to 
this committee chairmanship, Alabama (a state which had no top committee chairmen
3 
appointed in over 20 years) experienced a marked increase in its share of federal 
earmarks.  This is represented in Figure I, which compares Alabama’s annual earmarks to 
those in the rest of the United States.  Although earmark spending increased 
substantially in the US during this period, Alabama experienced roughly twice the 
average growth of all other states following Shelby’s appointment.  Specifically, while 
Alabama averaged 6 million dollars less in annual earmarks than the average of other US 
states before Shelby’s appointment, they averaged over 90 million dollars more than other 
states after his appointment. 
At this time, Homes Inc. was a large manufacturer of lower-cost fabricated homes 
headquartered in northern Alabama.
4  When Richard Shelby ascended to the 
chairmanship in 1997 and earmarks to Alabama increased, Homes Inc. significantly 
decreased its capital expenditures and employee base during the ensuing years.  A 
                                                 
2 In describing the impact of his Senate seniority on his home state of Pennsylvania, Arlen Specter recently 
remarked: "My senior position on appropriations has enabled me to bring a lot of jobs and a lot of federal 
funding to this state.  Pennsylvania has a big interest in my seniority, a big interest." 
3 We use several measures of top committees throughout the paper.  Here, we refer to our most broad 
category.  The list of the top 10 most influential committees is from Edwards and Stewart (2006); for the 
Senate these committees are Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, Rules, Armed Services, Foreign 
Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce. 
4 We have masked the name of this firm, although this is an actual example from our sample. Powerful Politicians — Page 5 
 
 
comparison of Homes Inc. to the rest of its industry outside of Alabama
5 reveals that 
while Homes Inc. significantly reduced its capital expenditures from this pre-appointment 
period, the rest of its industry in fact increased its rate of capital accumulation (-79.5% 
vs. 16.6% as a percentage of assets).  Further, while the industry reduced its rate of 
employment growth only modestly from the pre-appointment period, Homes Inc.’s 
curtailment in employment was much more substantial (-30.2% vs. -7.9%).  Lastly, while 
Homes Inc. saw a large and significant drop in sales, the rest of the industry remained 
approximately flat (-38.2% vs. -3.1%).  As a more tangible example of the possible 
mechanism, in the post-appointment period over $15 million in earmarks went specifically 
to the construction of housing and facilities for lower income families (which are a direct 
competitor to the prefabricated homes produced by Homes Inc.), contrasted with only 
$500,000 over the entire pre-appointment period. 
We show that the events in this example represent a much more systematic 
pattern across the universe of U.S. firms.  To do so, we investigate the private sector 
consequences of seniority shocks by studying the behavior of the public corporations 
headquartered in the congressman’s state.  Focusing on the investment (capital 
expenditure), employment, R&D, and payout decisions of these firms, we find strong and 
widespread evidence of corporate retrenchment in response to government spending 
shocks.  In the year that follows a congressman’s ascendency, the average firm in his state 
cuts back capital expenditures by roughly 15%.  These firms also significantly reduce 
R&D expenditures and increase payouts to their investors.  The magnitude of this private 
sector response is nontrivial: in the median state (which receives roughly $200 million per 
year in increased earmarks and federal transfers as a result of a seniority shock), capex 
and R&D reductions total $39 million and $34 million per year, respectively, while 
payout increases total $21 million per year. These changes in firm behavior persist 
throughout the chairmanship and begin to reverse after the congressman relinquishes the 
chairmanship.  We also find some evidence that firms scale back their employment, and 
experience a decline in sales growth. 
To explore the robustness of these findings, we verify that the patterns hold up 
under a wide variety of conditions and specifications.  We employ panel regressions using 
                                                 
5 Industry is defined as 1-digit SIC Code, which is 2 for Homes Inc.’s industry.  Powerful Politicians — Page 6 
 
 
state and time fixed effects and a range of controls.  We also conduct state-level 
regressions, averaging coefficients across states, and other non-parametric tests, verifying 
that a powerful committee chair has a statistically and economically large impact on the 
decisions of firms in their state. 
We also examine a variety of other predictions of how spending is likely to impact 
private sector firms.  In particular, we find that our results are mainly found in firms 
with geographically concentrated operations (e.g., domestic only firms) — firms that are 
likely to have more operations in the headquarter state, as well as firms with high 
capacity utilization (i.e., those with little slack in their capital stock). Also, consistent 
with Keynes’ view that crowding out should only occur under conditions of full 
employment, we find a weaker firm response to spending shocks when state-level 
employment is at or below its long-term historical average.   
A unique feature of our approach is that we can rule out the standard interest rate 
channel as an explanation for how government spending crowds out private sector 
investment.  Since our mechanism entails simply shifting the same government spending 
from the former chairman’s state to the new chairman’s state, no new government funds 
are implied; as a result, no increased taxation or increased borrowing costs are required.  
In addition, we conduct cross-state comparisons, thus abstracting from all national level 
effects.  Thus, our approach identifies a distinct and alternative mechanism by which 
government spending deters corporate investment.  In particular, we provide evidence 
that crowding out occurs through factors of production including the labor market and 
fixed industrial assets.  These findings argue that tax and interest rate channels, while 
obviously important, may not account for all or even most of the costs imposed by 
government spending.  Even in a setting in which government spending is “free” — that 
is, does not need to be financed with additional taxes or borrowing — its distortionary 
consequences may be nontrivial.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief 
background and literature review. Section II describes the data we use, while Sections III 
and IV explore our findings on the effects of seniority on congressional spending, and 
firms’ responses to these seniority shocks in their respective states. Section V provides a 




I.  Background and literature review 
There is a large empirical literature investigating the impact of government 
spending on consumption, investment, and output variables.  The standard approach in 
this literature is to apply a VAR methodology to macroeconomic data in order to identify 
shocks to government spending.
6  Most of these studies focus on quarterly post-war data 
in the U.S., which places a heavy burden on the econometrics to uncover the relationship 
from a limited time series of highly persistent variables.  Although some studies consider 
international panel data, variation in economic size and openness, labor market rigidities, 
and other considerations limit the amount of additional power these data add.
7  The  
literature has also pursued some alternative strategies to isolate changes in government 
spending that are truly exogenous.  For instance, several studies focus on periods of 
significant expansion in US defense spending (the so-called “Ramey-Shapiro episodes”) to 
examine the impact of spending shocks.
8  Because defense spending is viewed to be largely 
independent of domestic macroeconomic considerations, major changes therein offer 
opportunities to examine exogenous spending shocks.  Unfortunately, the occurrence of 
large and unambiguous shocks to government defense spending is somewhat rare, which 
restricts the power of these tests.
9 An advantage of our approach is that we are able to 
examine numerous exogenous shocks to state-level federal expenditures over an extended 
period of time and to quantify their impact on the behavior of US public corporations. 
There is also a literature comprised of mostly empirical studies examining how 
political representation translates to government expenditures.  These studies include 
Atlas et al. (1995), Hoover and Pecorino (2005), Crain and Tollison (1977, 1981), Goss 
(1972), Greene and Munley (1980), Kiel and McKenzie (1983), Ray (1980, 1981), Ritt 
(1976), Rundquist (1978), and Rundquist and Griffiths (1976).   Atlas et al. (1995) and 
Hoover and Pecorino (2005) document a positive relationship between per capita 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov 
(2001), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Perotti (2005), Pappa (2005), Caldara and Kamps (2006), and Galí, 
López-Salido, and Vallés (2007), Ramey (2008). 
7 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). 
8 See Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher (2004), and Cavallo (2005)). 
9 Cullen and Fishback (2006) document significant county-level variation in WWII spending increases and 
use this to examine the impact of government spending on longer-term private sector economic activity.   Powerful Politicians — Page 8 
 
 
representation in the Senate and state-level federal expenditures but find only limited 
evidence with respect to House representation.  Levitt and Poterba (1999) also find 
somewhat mixed evidence linking congressional seniority to federal spending; they do, 
however, find that senior Democratic members of the House were able to use their 
positions to improve their state’s economic performance.  Lastly, Aghion et al. (2009) 
show that representation on appropriations committees has an effect on education 
expenditures to states, finding support for some of these expenditures translating into 
future growth.
10  Taken as a whole, the literature finds only modest linkages between the 
nature of congressional representation and the distribution of congressional spending.   
Using novel data on government discretionary earmark spending, our paper adds new 
evidence to this literature by showing that changes in congressional committee 
chairmanship can have a significant influence on government spending outcomes. 
 
II.  Data 
  The data in this study are collected and coded from several sources.  For the 
majority of sources, we hand-collect, -code, and -match the data to combine the sources 
for our analysis.  To start, we obtain congressional earmark data from Citizens Against 
Government Waste, which collects earmark data by state starting in 1991.  An earmark 
is defined as a line item in an appropriations bill that designates tax dollars for a specific 
purpose  in circumvention of  established budgetary procedures.  While some of the 
earmarks are state designated, many are not, and so we read through and hand-match 
over 24,000 of these undesignated earmarks to the specific designated state.  In addition, 
for earmarks designated to more than one state, we split the amounts equally among the 
designated states.  For instance, one $200,000 earmark had no specific state designation, 
but was simply listed as designated for the "Sokaogon Chippewa Community," to 
"investigate impacts of a mine."  As this is a band of the Lake Superior Chippewa 
residing in Wisconsin, we match this earmark back to Wisconsin.  In addition, an 
example of a multi-state designated earmark is a $5,500,000 earmark labeled: "Dalles 
                                                 
10 Other papers that have used instruments for state-level government spending include Knight (2002 and 
2005) who uses transportation committee membership, and Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Gruber and 
Hungerman (2007), who use the tenure of appropriations committee members. Powerful Politicians — Page 9 
 
 
Powerhouse (Units 1-14), WA & OR (Corps of Engineers - Construction, General)", 
which we split equally at $2,750,000 to both of the affected states, WA and OR. 
  In addition to the earmark data, we also collect data on broader categories of 
government expenditures.  We obtain these from the annual survey of state and local 
government finances conducted by the US Census Bureau and reported on their website,
11 
with the data starting in 1992, broken down at the state level.  These transfers include 
highway and parks funding, agricultural funds, and other payments distributed to 
states.
12  In addition to this transfer data, we collect state-level population and square 
mileage figures from the Census Bureau. 
  Lastly, we use data on congressional committees from Stewart and Woon (2009) 
and Nelson (2005),
13 and link politicians (by state) to firms using the headquarters of all 
firms listed on Compustat.
14  Congressional committee data is available for the 80th to 
110th Congresses (corresponding to the time period 1947-2009), which allows us to match 
politicians to firms as far back as accurate Compustat accounting information is 
available.
15  From Compustat, we extract a host of firm-specific accounting variables, 
such as capital expenditures, research and development (R&D) expenditures, total 
payouts (equal to cash dividends plus repurchases), and number of employees.   
  We define seniority shocks by assigning a dummy variable equal to 1 if the senator 
(or representative) of a given state first becomes chairman of an influential congressional 
committee.  The list of the 10 most influential committees is from Edwards and Stewart 
(2006); for the Senate these committees are Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, 
Rules, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce, 
and for the House these committees are Ways and Means, Appropriations, Energy and 
Commerce, Rules, International Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence, Judiciary, 
                                                 
11 http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html. 
12 In our tests using this transfer data, we exclude category B79, which consists of nondiscretionary 
spending on public welfare items, e.g., Medicaid. 
13 This data is available online on Charles Stewart’s website: 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. 
14 Compustat’s firm headquarters variable is backfilled, so that firms that have moved are miscoded 
historically; however, the incidence of firm headquarters relocation is extremely rare, and we have corrected 
the obvious errors.   
15 For members of the House of Representatives, note that we are unable to historically match all firms to 
individual congressional districts, since mappings between zipcodes and congressional districts are only 
available from the 103rd Congress onwards; thus we map both senators and representatives to their home 
states. Powerful Politicians — Page 10 
 
 
Homeland Security, and Transportation and Infrastructure.  We categorize shocks into 
various groups based on the committee rankings; for example, Shock Top1ChairOnly 
means the senator (representative) was appointed chairman of the top-ranked Senate 
Finance Committee (the House Ways and Means Committee).  We also construct an 
alternative shock definition that includes both the chairman and the ranking minority 
member (i.e., the most senior committee member who is a member of the party not 
currently in control of that House of congress), so that Shock Top1Chair&Rank is equal 
to 1 if a senator becomes either chairman or the ranking minority member of the 
committee, when he/she was previously not in either position in the prior Congress.  In 
our baseline specification, we code seniority shocks as starting in the year of appointment, 
and apply them for 6 years (term of a senator), although we vary this timing in a number 
of robustness checks.
16   
  
III.  Results 
A. Congressional Spending and Seniority 
Our main sample focuses on the behavior of 16,734 firms over the past 42 years 
(1967-2008).  Summary statistics are reported in Table I.  In addition to our main 
dependent and control variables, Panel A reports the fraction of firm-year observations 
that occur in a state represented by a congressman who has been appointed chair (or has 
become the ranking minority member) of a powerful congressional committee within the 
past six years.  We consider separately observations represented by a congressman 
chairing a Senate committee and chairing a House committee.  We use the Edwards and 
Stewart (2006) ranking of committees to identify the most powerful committees (outlined 
in Section II) and report the fraction of firm-year observations from the top 1, 3, 5, and 
10 most powerful Senate committees as well as the top 1 and 3 most powerful House 
committees.    
Table I indicates that, depending on how many committees are included, between 
3.0% and 19.6% of the firm-year observations are headquartered in states represented by 
                                                 
16 We apply these shocks only to firms alive in the initial year of the shock, but we have also run all of the 
tests in the paper with shocks applied to all firms alive at any point during the full shock period and the 
results are very similar to those reported here. Powerful Politicians — Page 11 
 
 
a senator that has recently become chairman (or ranking minority member).  We also 
report the fraction of firm-year observations in states where the senator stepped down 
from the chair within the past six years.  The last six rows of Panel A also examine 
shocks to the most powerful House committees.  For the House shocks, we see that a 
relatively greater fraction of firm-year observations occur in states represented by a 
House committee chair. This reflects the fact that larger states, which have larger House 
congressional delegations, are more likely to find one of their representatives chairing a 
powerful House committee.  This also suggests that our House and Senate shocks are 
occurring in a relatively non-overlapping set of firm-year observations.   
More generally, an advantageous aspect of our data and identification is that 
House and Senate committee chair shocks occur, in large part, in different states (and 
years).  Thus, each chamber’s shocks can be seen as independent testing samples for the 
effect of these government spending shocks on firm behavior.  This state-shock difference 
is seen more clearly in the last two columns of Table II.  
We also report state-level variables in Panel B of Table I.  Since we only have 
earmark data from 1991 through 2008, the main variables are reported for this 18-year 
period.  Average annual earmarks are $116 million per state, with the median state 
receiving $72 million in a given year.  Panel C of Table I reports the average number of 
years that each chairman (or ranking member) remains in his position, for all Top 10 
committees.  In the Senate, the average chair tenure is 7.6 years (median of 6, max of 
24), and in the House, the average chair tenure is 6.3 (median 6, max of 24); these figures 
suggest that firms are unlikely to view these seniority shocks as temporary events that 
might induce firms to simply shift capital or labor investments out a few years into the 
future, but rather as a long-term shock.  For instance, it is unlikely that a firm could 
convince workers to take (in expectation) a seven-year furlow; thus the reductions we see 
are likely not short-run shifts in allocations over time.  
Table II confirms that most states have, at some point in the past 42 years, had 
one of its senators or representatives chairing a powerful committee.  And while earmark 
spending lines up somewhat well with population, a number of low-population states 
appear surprisingly high on the list.  To see this more closely, in Figure II we plot 
earmarks against state population.  The expected positive relationship is confirmed but Powerful Politicians — Page 12 
 
 
the figure also reveals a number of significant positive outliers in terms of earmarks, the 
largest of which are Hawaii, Alaska, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Alabama: All states 
which had powerful congressional chairmen over our sample period.   
In Table III, we report the results of regressions that seek to explain variation in 
annual state-level earmarks with changes in congressional committee chairmanship.  We 
include state and year fixed effects in each regression, and standard errors are clustered 
at the state level.
17  The analysis reveals a strong relationship between seniority shocks 
and earmark spending.  A state whose senator is appointed chair of one of the three most 
powerful committees receives roughly a 40-50% increase in earmark spending.  For 
instance, the coefficient on ShockTop1ChairOnly in Column 2 indicates that having a top 
committee chair increases that state’s earmarks over the subsequent six years by 44.6% 
(t=8.77) per year.  From Table I, the average (median) annual earmarks per state are 
$116 million ($72 million), so this implies a $51 million ($32 million) increase in earmarks 
per year to a state upon having its senator appointed chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee (most powerful Senate committee).  In Column 2, we add a series of controls, 
including (the log of) state-level population, the state-level average of (log) per capita 
income over the past 6 years, and lagged values of state level (log) per capita income 
growth and state-level unemployment rates.  Including these controls leaves the results 
unchanged.  
As we broaden the set of powerful committees, the effect gets weaker but remains 
large and statistically significant (for the Top 10 committees, the increase is 22.4% 
(t= 2 . 4 9 ) ) .   T h e  s a m e  h o l d s  t r u e  a s  w e  include ranking minority members (e.g. 
Chair&Rank vs. ChairOnly).  To the extent that these senators are less powerful than 
those chairing one of the very top committees, we might expect a decline in their ability 
to deliver earmark spending to their state.  However, even in these Chair&Rank 
measures, the effect remains large and statistically significant.  In unreported tests we 
also find evidence that earmark spending declines upon the departure of a committee 
chair, with states represented by a senator who relinquishes one of the top committees 
                                                 
17 Also, we have run these tests clustering standard errors by state-shock period, rather than just state.  
Since our analysis exploits variation within state, clustering by state is conservative.  Clustering by state-
shock period produces smaller standard errors (and so larger t-stats), for instance the full specification 
Column 2’s t-stat is 9.07 (vs. 8.77 with the currently reported clustering by state), and so we report the 
more conservative measure.  Powerful Politicians — Page 13 
 
 
experiencing a 20-30% decline in their earmarks.
18  
 
B.  Seniority and Corporate Retrenchment 
We have shown: i.) that there is considerable variation in earmark spending across 
states, and ii.) that having a powerful congressional committee chairman appointed from 
one’s state has a strong influence on this spending.  We now turn to the impact of this 
spending on corporate behavior.  Specifically, we investigate whether exogenous 
government spending shocks — as instrumented by congressional seniority shocks — have a 
material influence on corporate behavior.  We examine a number of corporate investment 
decisions including capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, payout, and employment 
decisions.  We regress each of these firm-level dependent variables on the state-level 
seniority shocks as well as a number of firm-level controls.  We consider separately 
positive and negative shocks to seniority as well as shocks to the seniority of Senate and 
House members.  
Our first analysis focuses on the capital expenditure decision of firms.  The 
motivation behind this test is that the federal transfer itself may structurally substitute 
for private capital investment.  An often cited example of this is the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s (TVA) construction of electricity plants along the Tennessee Valley in the 
1930’s. Private enterprises that had planned expansion and provision of service of this 
same region were forced to decrease investment and to downsize employees.  For instance, 
the nation’s largest electric utility holding company entering into the depression, 
Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, was unable to compete with the TVA in the 
Tennessee Valley and as a result was forced to decrease investment there, and to 
eventually dispose of properties in the Tennessee Valley, selling them directly to the TVA 
for $78.6 million in 1939 (Barnard (1966) and Manchester (1974)).    
The regressions in Table IV regress capital expenditures, measured as firm capex 
scaled by (lagged) firm assets, on Senate seniority shocks and a number of control 
variables.  This represents a reduced form estimation using our instrument of shocks to 
senior chairmanship.  We explore in the next section (and in Table V) a two stage least 
                                                 
18 For instance, following the drop of a chair or ranking member of a Top 3 committee, earmarks are cut 
back by 33.3% (t=1.72). Powerful Politicians — Page 14 
 
 
squares estimation (regressing earmarks on seniority in the first stage) that yields the 
instrumented value of government transfers, along with falsification tests for the 
instrument itself.  The regressions in Table IV include firm and year fixed effects, and 
standard errors are clustered at the state and year level.   
From Columns 1-7 of Table IV, seniority shocks result in economically and 
statistically significant declines in firm capital expenditures.  Across all measures of 
seniority, the declines are large and highly significant.  For instance, again looking at 
ShockTop1ChairOnly, the coefficient implies a 1.2% drop in scaled capital expenditures 
(t=3.46).  Since firms have average capital expenditures of 8 percent of assets, Senate 
chairmanship causes a roughly 15 percent reduction in the representative firm’s capex.
19  
Including controls in Columns 2-7 has only a modest effect on the magnitude of shocks, 
and all are still statistically significant.  In line with the earmarks results in Table III is 
the fact that chairmen of more powerful committees have a larger impact on firm capex 
as well.  Lastly, from Columns 8 and 9, again consistent with the reduction in earmarks 
following the relinquishing of chairmanship, following replacement of the chairman firms 
in the state partially restore their capex spending, increasing it by 0.6 to 0.7 percent of 
assets which represents around 8 percent of the average firm’s capital expenditures. 
In Panel A of Table V, we repeat the capital expenditure analysis with House 
seniority shocks.  The results are statistically strong but slightly smaller in economic 
magnitude.  Depending on the specification, capital expenditures decline between 0.1 - 0.6 
percent.  This corresponds to (again for ShockTop1ChairOnly, now corresponding to the 
House Ways and Means Committee) a 7 percent reduction the representative firm’s 
capex.  The more modest effect might be expected as House members may be more 
interested in directing funds towards their particular district (as opposed to their state in 
general). Thus, firms headquartered in other districts within their state may be less 
impacted by state-level federal spending increases that result from seniority shocks in the 
House, as opposed to those from the Senate.  In Columns 8 and 9, we again see firms 
increasing their capex after their congressman relinquishes his or her chairmanship.   
 
                                                 
19 Further, as we demonstrate later in Table V Panel B, when we split the sample into above- and below-
median sized firms, both groups of firms respond significantly to seniority shocks, and the estimated 
coefficients are similar, suggesting that our results are not limited to small firms.  Powerful Politicians — Page 15 
 
 
C.  Instrument of Committee Chairman Shocks 
The fact that government behavior is affected by private sector economic activity 
makes it difficult to identify the effects of government spending from the factors that 
cause that government spending to change.  As disentangling this is the key to gaining 
insight into the impact of government spending on private sector activity, some kind of 
exogenous variation in government spending is needed.  As noted above, the instrument 
we use is the appointment to powerful committee chairmanship in the Senate and House.  
Our choice is motivated by the fact that one’s appointment to committee chairmanship is 
based almost entirely on seniority within the chamber (see Polsby et al. (1969)).
20  Thus, 
the only way for a congressman to be appointed the chairman of a committee is for the 
current chairman to relinquish the chairmanship: either through that chairman’s election 
defeat, resignation, death, or through the chairman losing party-control of that chamber 
of Congress.  Since all of these events depend largely on political circumstances or events 
in  other states, a congressman’s ascension to a powerful committee chair creates a 
positive shock to his or her state’s share of federal funds that is virtually independent of 
his or her state’s economic conditions.  We have shown in Table III that this shock 
results in economically large and significant government spending transfers to the new 
chairman’s state. 
In the absence of an instrument, the direction of the expected corporate response is 
unclear; the government may choose to send money to struggling areas, populated by 
firms with relatively poor investment opportunities, or the government may try to 
maximize spending-impact by sending capital to regions with especially good investment 
opportunities.  To illustrate this endogeneity between government spending and private 
sector economic activity, and the problems this can cause for identification, in Column 1 
of Table V Panel B we simply regress earmark spending on scaled capital expenditures.  
                                                 
20 As mentioned in Footnote 1, the seniority system has been the prevailing determinant of committee 
chairmanships since the early days of Congress in both chambers.  Although occasional deviations from 
seniority-based chairmanship do appear in the data (see Deering and Wahlbeck (2006) for a discussion), our 
results are very similar if we use changes in the identity of the most-senior committee member in place of 
changes in committee chairmanship.  For example, the coefficient in column 3 of Table IV (=-0.008, 
t=2.94, using changes in chairmanship) is virtually identical (=-0.008, t=3.11) when we instead use changes 
in the identity of the most-senior committee member to define our shocks.  This fact holds true across all 
shock variables, and across all outcome variables (i.e., earmarks, capex, R&D, payouts, employment 
changes, and sales growth).   Powerful Politicians — Page 16 
 
 
From Column 1, the regression exhibits no relationship, with the coefficient on earmarks 
being small and statistically zero (t=0.55).  However, when we use the instrumented 
value in Column 2, which consists solely of the portion of earmarks that is related to 
seniority shocks (the first stage is given in Table III), the strong negative relationship 
returns.  Here we use the Top3ChairOnly as the measure of powerful committee, so 
comparing this to the corresponding Column 4 in Table IV, we see that the IV estimate 
here of -1.2% decline (t=2.26) is roughly double the magnitude of even the reduced form 
estimate (-0.6%) albeit over a shorter time period.  Thus these results in Columns 1 and 
2 of Table V Panel B suggest that a significant portion of the variation in earmark 
spending is, indeed, determined endogenously in the context of corporate investment 
behavior, and breaking this endogeneity is critical to making the correct inference of the 
impact of government spending on firm behavior.   
Even though we obtain stronger results in magnitude when we use the 
instrumented values for earmark spending (Table V Panel B, Column 2), we use the 
reduced form shocks for most of the tests performed in the paper.  The reason we prefer 
these is that we have data on the shocks going back to the late 1940’s, as opposed to only 
1991 for the earmark data, so we get a richer period of time and events (more changes in 
committee seniority and chairmanship, more investment decisions by firms, etc.) to 
examine the relationship between government spending and the behavior of firms. 
In Column 3 of Panel B, we also perform a falsification test on our instrument.  
Instead of using the actual shocks to senior powerful committee chairmanship, we create 
a variable called Random Shocks, which takes the entire matrix of state-years, and 
assigns purely random committee chair "shocks" using a random number generator.
21  We 
then regress these random state-year shocks on scaled capital expenditures, to make sure 
we are not identifying random variation.  From Column 3, the coefficient is basically zero 
(-0.00% (t=0.57)).  This result suggests that the identification being captured by our 
powerful committee chair shocks is not simply spurious variation.  
In Columns 4 and 5, we repeat the basic capex regression used in Table IV, but 
                                                 
21 We keep the same measurement, allowing these shocks to persist for six years following the random 
"shock to chairmanship."  As with the real chair shocks, we have varied this length and it makes no 
difference to these results.  We report the six year length to make these comparable to the true shock 
variables we report.  Powerful Politicians — Page 17 
 
 
now on two different subsamples.  In Column 4, we restrict our sample to only those 
firms above the median in lagged market capitalization each year (computed from our 
sample), in order to assess if our results are driven entirely by small firms.  Column 4 
reveals a large and significant effect of seniority shocks on the capex decisions of large 
firms as well, with the coefficient of similar magnitude to the full sample result (-0.005 vs. 
-0.006 for the full sample from Table IV Column 5).  Lastly, we again run the same 
specification from Table IV Column 5, but this time on a subsample of the Senate shocks 
that excludes those seniority shocks where the prior chairman lost an election or 
primary.
22  Column 5 of Table V indicates that this filter has no effect on our results, as 
the magnitude of the coefficient on the shock variable (=-0.006, t=3.44) is identical to 
the coefficient reported in Table IV Column 5 (=-0.006, t=3.57). 
 
D. Research and Development Investments and Payouts 
 We next examine other firm behaviors that may be affected by a firm facing a 
different investment set following a government spending shock.  Specifically we look at 
both R&D spending and payout decisions of firms.  We present these results in Table VI 
with firm-level R&D in Panel A, and payout decisions in Panel B, with both scaled by 
lagged assets (as in the capital expenditure tests).  Again we include firm level controls, 
in addition to firm and year fixed effects.  Consistent with firm capital expenditure 
behavior from Sections B and C, Panel A of Table VI illustrates that seniority shocks 
result in material reductions in R&D investment.  Specifically, looking at House and 
Senate shocks,
23 from Columns 1 and 7, Senate and House seniority shocks results in a 
reduction in R&D spending of between 0.5-0.9% (t=2.64 and 3.31) per firm.  Since the 
average firm R&D is 7.3 percent of assets, the impact is non-trivial in economic terms (a 
roughly 7-12 percent scaling back of R&D).  We again find corroborating evidence that 
upon the departure of the committee chair, R&D spending is restored.  
                                                 
22 Our sample consists of 232 seniority shocks to a Top 10 committee chair or ranking minority seat, 115 
from the Senate and 117 from the House.  More than half of these Top 10 shocks were due to the death or 
resignation of the prior chairman, and only 17 of these shocks in the Senate (and 19 in the House) involve a 
lost election by the prior chair or ranking member. 
23 For brevity here, we only report Top1 and Top3 committee shocks.  The results for other measures, as in 
Tables IV, are both stronger for ChairOnly, and gradually weaken as we allow in relatively less powerful 
committees, which is also consistent with the estimated impacts on earmark appropriations from the 
relative power of the different committee chairmanships.  Powerful Politicians — Page 18 
 
 
Panel B then examines the effect on payout decisions. If public firms are crowding 
out the investment opportunity sets of firms, we might expect firms to respond to this 
reduced investment opportunity set by (investing less and) paying more out to 
shareholders. This is precisely what we see in Panel B of Table VI.  Following a seniority 
shock, we see payouts significantly increasing.  Column 1 reveals that payouts increase 
after seniority shocks by 0.3% (t=4.15); for our firms, payout averages 2.3 percent of 
assets, so this represents a 13% increase in payouts.  The results are similar after House 
shocks (with the effect ranging between 0.1-0.3%).  We also find some evidence that this 
effect again appears to reverse following the congressman’s departure (e.g., the coefficient 
on Drop_Top1ChairOnly is -0.001, t=1.71).  
 
E.  Firm Level Employment and Valuation Consequences 
In our next set of tests, we examine the impact of shocks to congressional seniority 
on firm-level employment.  The same reasoning behind retrenchment in corporate 
investment behavior applies to the labor decisions of firms.  Any downsizing of firms may 
involve scaling back both investments in labor and capital.  Also, as the government may 
compete for skilled (and perhaps specialized) labor, this may reduce the labor pool for the 
private sector.   
We test this prediction of the impact of seniority shocks on firm-level employment 
growth in Panel A of Table VII.  Panel A illustrates a modest effect of seniority shocks 
on firm-level changes in the number of employees.  In Columns 1-3 the sign is always 
negative for Senate shocks (and also for the rest of the unreported shocks), but the effect 
is only significant for Shock_Top3Chair&Rank (=-0.011, t=2.41).  House seniority 
shocks have a consistently negative and significant effect on firm-level changes in 
employment.  The magnitudes of the coefficients ranges between -0.6% to -2.7%, implying 
that corporations scale down their employment growth rates by 3-15%.  For both the 
House and the Senate, Columns 7 and 8 demonstrate that the effects are stronger in the 
second half of the sample period (1990-2008): the coefficients on Shock_Top3Chair&Rank 
during this period are -0.024 (t=3.12) and -0.017 (t=2.41), respectively.   
Although our evidence thus far identifies corporate retrenchment in response to 
federal spending shocks, the valuation consequences of these shocks for public Powerful Politicians — Page 19 
 
 
corporations remains somewhat ambiguous.  In particular, it is conceivable that, although 
firms cut capex, R&D, and to a lesser extent employment (and meanwhile increase 
payouts to shareholders), the federal spending shocks generate spillovers from which they 
benefit.  Typically, endogeneity concerns compel researchers to study the valuation 
consequences of such shocks by examining share price responses.  Unfortunately, such 
event-study market price tests lose power rapidly in settings where the event window is 
necessarily wide because the precise timing of the event is poorly known.  Our setting 
likely requires a window on the order of several months to a year, because spending 
shocks are revealed gradually as the probability of a given congressman’s ascension 
evolves with changes in polling data about election outcomes and factors influencing 
incumbent retirement. 
An alternative is to examine accounting measures directly.  Because of our reliance 
on a clean instrument for federal spending shocks, we can directly infer the causal effect 
of increased government spending on accounting measures of corporate welfare.  In Panel 
B of Table VII, we present regressions of sales growth on our seniority shocks.
24  The 
results suggest that a seniority shock causes firm sales growth to retract 0.9 to 5.4 
percent per year during the subsequent six years relative to non-shocked firms and 
periods.  However, these results are only statistically significant for the House shocks and 
for the Senate Shock_Top3Chair&Rank specification; thus we interpret these results as 
less strong, yet still suggestive evidence of possible negative valuation consequences for 
the public firms that operate out of states that are recipients of federal government 
transfers.  As with the employment results, the negative impact on sales growth is more 
pronounced in the second half of the sample: the coefficients on Shock_Top3Chair&Rank 
for the House and Senate during the 1990-2008 period are -0.039 (t=3.46) and -0.026 
(t=2.72), respectively.     
 
                                                 
24 We have run similar tests where we replace sales growth in these regressions with return on assets (a 
measure of profitability), and find generally negative (but insignificant) effects of seniority shocks on 
profitability.  Powerful Politicians — Page 20 
 
 
IV.  Mechanism and Robustness 
A. Federal Transfers and Factor Slack 
In this section we begin to explore the mechanism at work behind our results.  We 
start by examining whether our results apply to broader measures of state-level federal 
spending.  Specifically, Column 1 of Table VIII uses data from the US Census Bureau’s 
annual survey of state and local government finances.  We use annual federal transfers to 
state governments from 1992-2007 on the left-hand side of these regressions in place of 
the annual earmarks employed previously in Table III.  These transfers, which include 
highway and parks funding, agricultural funds, etc., average roughly $3 billion per year 
per state.  Although the measure is noisier and likely contains elements of non-
discretionary federal spending, we do explicitly exclude category B79, which consists of 
obvious non-discretionary spending on public welfare items (e.g., Medicaid).  Using this 
transfer measure, we find similar results to those with earmark spending.  In particular, a 
seniority shock results in a 9.4% (t=2.85) increase in total federal transfers to the state.  
Since the average (median) state receives $3 billion ($1.8 billion), this translates to an 
increase of roughly $280 million ($172 million) per year in federal transfers.   
In addition to examining broader measures of spending, we also explore the 
particular firms for which (and conditions under which) we might expect state-level 
increases in federal spending to have a more pronounced effect on corporate investment.  
Specifically, we test whether firms with high capacity utilization (implying a relatively 
small amount of slack private capital) are those for whom spending shocks have larger 
effects on corporate investment, as competition from the public sector may have a more 
pronounced effect on firms for whom facilities and specialized capital are already in high 
demand.  We use a capacity utilization measure collected by the US Federal Reserve for 
industries in manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities.  The measure, which is 
available on their website,
25 captures each industry’s seasonally-adjusted output level 
relative to its maximum sustainable level of output.  The latter value, which is measured 
at the plant level, is the maximum level of output the plant can achieve under a 
reasonable work schedule and with sufficient availability of inputs to operate the capital 
                                                 
25 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/About.htm Powerful Politicians — Page 21 
 
 
in place.  We then regress firm-level scaled capital expenditures on the seniority shock as 
well as an indicator variable that identifies firms operating at a time when their 
industry’s capacity utilization is at or below the median capacity utilization across all 
firms in a given year (Low Util).   
The regression in Column 2 of Table VIII confirms the basic negative relation 
between seniority and capital expenditures, but the interaction term between shock and 
low capacity utilization is positive.  This suggests the crowding out of private investment 
is particularly pronounced in industries operating at a high level of capacity where 
competition for additional factors of production including facilities and specialized capital 
is expected to be strong (and conversely, that where capacity utilization is low (i.e., when 
Low Util equals 1), there is a smaller effect of the shocks). 
We then explore if the government’s hiring of skilled labor may be especially 
harmful to private firms when there is scarce employable labor (a notion of full 
employment), while conversely, with slack in the labor market, government hiring shocks 
may have an attenuated effect.  To investigate whether the crowding out of corporate 
employment is particularly pronounced when unemployment is low, we split seniority 
shocks into those that occur when the state’s unemployment rate is above its long-run 
average and those that occur when it is below.  As Table VIII reports (in Column 3), the 
coefficient on firms in states with low unemployment is -0.016.  For firms in states with 
high unemployment, the coefficient is 0.024 larger, which is sufficient to reverse the effect 
entirely (even considering the main effect of High Unemployment itself).  This result can 
be interpreted as providing evidence consistent with the view that government stimulus 
crowds out private sector employment when the economy has little slack in the labor 
market, but does not when the economy is experiencing significant slack in the labor 
market. 
 
B.  Who Benefits? 
Our results demonstrate that the average firm retrenches in the face of 
government spending shocks, but it is certainly possible (and perhaps likely) that some 
individual firms do in fact benefit from these spending shocks.  The incidence of lobbying 
by firms certainly suggests that firms perceive some possible benefits from currying favor Powerful Politicians — Page 22 
 
 
with politicians (see Roberts (1990), Jayachandran (2006), Goldman et al. (2007, 2008), 
Faccio (2006), Faccio et al. (2006), Faccio and Parsley (2006), Fisman (2001), and 
Fisman et al. (2007) for evidence linking politicians and political connections to firm 
benefits).  While we have much less power to detect benefits to individual firms using our 
approach (which relies on state-level seniority shocks that apply to all firms in a given 
state), we do provide some indirect evidence in this section that certain specific firms that 
we can identify as having received valuable contracts from the government are less likely 
to retrench in the face of seniority shocks.   
To do this we exploit firm-level data on government procurement contracts.  Our 
data consists of 2.1 million contracts with a total value of over $1.4 trillion awarded to 
1560 publicly-firms over the period 1984-2008, provided by the company Eagle Eye.   
Specifically, in Column 4 of Table VIII we re-run our baseline capex regressions from 
Table IV, but now also interact the seniority shock variable (Shock_Top1ChairOnly) 
with a dummy for whether or not the firm in question received a government 
procurement contract at some point earlier in our sample.   The magnitude of this 
interaction term (=0.009, t=3.12) is equally large (but of opposite sign) as the main 
effect on the shock variable (=-0.010, t=6.27), suggesting that firms that have received 
government procurement contracts do not cut back in response to government spending 
shocks.   
 
C.  Robustness and Additional Tests 
Our final tests examine the robustness of our results, and provide a few ancillary 
tests of our findings.  Our first robustness test is to examine whether the results hold up 
when we consider each state separately in our regressions and then evaluate the average 
coefficients produced.  This approach effectively treats all observations in a given state as 
a single observation.  To the extent that our results thus far are driven disproportionately 
by the firms of a few large states, this specification will severely limit their ability to 
impact our results.  Also, to the extent that a large amount of correlation exists within 
states in the investment, R&D, payout, and employment decisions, this specification will 
conservatively consider these decisions to be effectively perfectly correlated with one 
another.  Thus we are sacrificing a large amount of power to get an alternate (quite strict Powerful Politicians — Page 23 
 
 
and conservative) estimate of our effects.   
In Panel A of Table IX, we report the cross-sectional average of the state 
regression coefficients and the associated test statistic against a null that the average 
coefficient is zero.  Specifically, we run the exact same firm-level regressions as in Tables 
IV-VII, but run them each fifty separate times, once for each state (similar to a Fama-
MacBeth approach); we then report the cross-sectional average of the fifty shock 
coefficients from the state-level regressions.  Overall, the results are remarkably similar to 
those reported earlier.  Seniority shocks lead to a 2.6 percent decline in capex, a 0.3 
percent decline in R&D, a 9.1 percent decline in employment growth, a 13.0 percent 
decline in sales growth, and a 0.4 percent increase in total payouts. Considering that we 
include any of the top 10 committees in this specification in order to maximize the 
number of states affected by a shock, the economic magnitudes here are generally larger 
when states are treated as single observations. A non-parametric test that asks whether 
the fraction of states with coefficients of the predicted sign is significantly different from 
0.5 is rejected at the one percent level for four of the five dependent variables. 
In Panel B of Table IX we test an additional implication of the mechanism of 
government spending crowding out private sector economic activity.  Specifically, the 
effect of government spending shocks on firm behavior should be larger for those firms 
with concentrated operations; i.e., firms that cannot shift investment out of state, and 
that have more difficulty accessing inter-state capital, land, and labor markets.  We use 
the Compustat Segment Database to identify the various geographic segments of firms.  
Unfortunately, the segment database only lists segment location data at the country level 
(as opposed to state), so we proxy for geographic concentration of firms with those that 
do not (versus those that do) have international operations.  We see that our results — 
especially the capex and employment reactions — are more pronounced among domestic-
only firms.
26  Thus, firms with more limited ability to shift their operations to other 
countries or states are more compelled to reduce their capex and employment in response 
to government spending shocks. 
                                                 
26 We find similar results in panel regressions that include an interaction effect designed to measure the 
impact of shocks on only those firms with domestic operations, and controlling for firm size, and firm fixed 
and year fixed effects.  For brevity, the results shown here (and in Panel C below) only employ the 
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank variable, but the findings in both panels are similar regardless of the shock 
variable used. Powerful Politicians — Page 24 
 
 
Finally, in Panel C we report the timing of corporate responses to seniority shocks. 
For capex, R&D, and payout, the adjustment is rapid and permanent.  The adjustment 
that occurs during the year following the shock captures most of the long-run effect.  On 
the other hand, the employment adjustment appears more gradual, with virtually none of 
the long-run adjustment occurring during the first year.  This suggests that firms can 
retrench on the investment front more easily than labor.  The final two columns compare 
the regression coefficients for our main dependent variables of interest prior to and 
following the shock,  but only for the subset of firms that are shocked during the sample 
period.  The penultimate column reports the coefficients produced if the shock variable 
(Shock_Top3Chair&Rank) is turned on for the six years following the appointment, as in 
Tables III-VII, while the last column reports the coefficients when the variable is turned 
on during the six years preceding the appointment.  The shock coefficients are similar to 
those reported earlier, while the pre-shock coefficients are all insignificant and essentially 
zero in magnitude.  Thus we find no evidence that firms anticipate and prepare for 
changes in committee chairmanship.  
 
V.  Discussion 
The central finding of this paper is that positive shocks to the seniority of a state’s 
congressional delegation cause large and persistent increases in government allocated 
funding to the states, and significant retrenchment on the part of the corporations 
headquartered in the state.  This retrenchment appears to be a response to the large and 
persistent increase in federal funding that the state receives following the shock.   
Following the appointment of a senator to the chair of a powerful committee, we estimate 
that his state experiences, on average, a 40-50 percent increase in its share of 
congressional earmark spending, and a 9-10 percent increase in its share of total state-
level government transfers.  At the same time, firms residing in the state cut their capital 
expenditures by 8-15 percent, reduce R&D by 7-12 percent, and increase payout by 4-13 
percent.  Employment and sales growth are also impacted, as corporations scale back 
employment growth by 3-15%, and sales growth falls by up to 15%. 
We focus on firm-level responses, rather than state-level measures of economic 
activity such as GDP or employment, since firm-level capital and R&D expenditures, Powerful Politicians — Page 25 
 
 
payout decisions, and employment changes can be accurately measured in over 16,000 
publicly-traded firms over a 42-year time period.  Our approach thus produces a panel 
with substantial time-series and cross-sectional variation in relatively stationary 
dependent variables that delivers ample power--even when standard errors are adjusted to 
allow for correlation across firms or time--to accurately assess the impact of spending 
shocks. 
A key feature of our results is that they show up under a variety of specifications, 
many of which offer essentially independent tests of the main result.  First, firm responses 
to seniority shocks in the Senate are confirmed when we look at those in the House 
instead.  This test gets its power from the fact that the House and Senate shocks are 
nearly a non-overlapping set of state-year shocks.  Second, we find evidence that this 
behavior is partially reversed when the congressman relinquishes the chairmanship.   
Third, our coefficients are essentially identical whether we include state or time fixed-
effects or when we include other regressors known to account for variation in firm 
spending, payout, and employment decisions.  Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, our 
results show up when we simply take cross-state averages of within-state time-series 
regression coefficients.  Taken together, these results suggest a link between congressional 
seniority shocks and corporate behavior that is not confined to particular points in time 
or driven by observations in a handful of states. 
Our findings also include a number of results that corroborate the link between 
congressional spending and corporate retrenchment.  First, the link grows weaker as we 
broaden our definition of what constitutes a powerful committee.  The results are also 
generally weaker (in economic terms) in the House than the Senate, which one would 
predict given the fact that a congressional representative may have less impact on federal 
spending directed towards other districts within his state.  Relatedly, we show that 
congressional spending has less impact on firms with more geographically diversified 
operations. Since these firms are more geographically disperse, they are less affected by 
spending shocks that are confined to the state of their headquarters. 
The magnitude of this private sector response is nontrivial.  For the period over 
which we have earmark and federal transfer data (1992-2008), the median state receives 
$34 million in earmarks plus $172 million in transfers as a result of a seniority shock.  Powerful Politicians — Page 26 
 
 
Meanwhile, over this same time period, capex and R&D reductions in the median state 
total $39 million and $34 million per year, respectively, while payout increases total $21 
million per year.
27 Importantly, however, these calculations should not be interpreted as a 
valid estimate of the fiscal multiplier, the computation of which is a task beyond the 
scope of this paper, since they ignore the effect of government spending on private (non-
publicly-traded) firms as well as on household consumption, and they ignore the impact 
of other types of spending (e.g., federal grants, defense spending, etc.--hence we do not 
capture "total" spending). 
Our results beg the question of what mechanism causes firms to respond so 
negatively to state-level federal spending increases.  What is essentially a transfer of 
funds from the residents of one state (i.e., the state of the relinquishing committee chair) 
to another (i.e., the state of the ascending committee chair) causes retrenchment in the 
corporations that serve and employ the residents of the recipient state.  Since our results 
focus on reallocations of federal spending rather than increases thereof, we can rule out 
the standard interest rate and tax channels that have occupied the literature to this 
point.  Some of our results point towards the role of competition for state-specific factors 
of production, including labor and fixed assets such as real estate.  Public spending 
appears to increase demand for state-specific factors of production and thereby compel 
firms to downsize and invest elsewhere.  In particular, our capex results are weaker for 
firms with low capacity utilization, and our employment results are weaker when 
employment rates are at or below their long-term state-specific averages.  When slack 
exists in factories or the labor market, federal dollars do not appear to be as large of a 
deterrent to corporations in terms of investing or hiring.  In unreported results, we also 
find evidence that the effects are most pronounced in sectors that are the target of 
earmark spending. The ability of our results to speak to the net impact of national-level 
spending shocks on national-level economic outcomes depends critically on whether states 
are similar to national economies.  To the extent that states are small open economies, 
any “leakage” that blunts the impact of fiscal stimulus as firms shift investment to other 
states may be unique to the state-level results and limit the conclusions one can draw 
                                                 
27 We compute these state-level figures by calculating the average difference in scaled capex (or scaled 
R&D, or scaled payouts) between shocked and non-shocked firms in a given state over all firm-years, and 
multiplying that difference by the average of the yearly state-level sums of lagged assets. Powerful Politicians — Page 27 
 
 
regarding fiscal policy in a large, national economy.   
However, a key feature of our data is that firm-level figures reflect capex, R&D, 
payout, employment, and sales growth aggregated across all  operations of the firm, 
including divisions located in other states.  This means that our results are calculated net 
of any within-firm shifts in resources and activity that occur in response to the spending 
shock.  Thus, our results are only subject to leakage that occurs when investors in firms 
headquartered in the target state reallocate capital through their portfolios to other firms 
located in other states.  To the extent that portfolio capital has greater mobility across 
states than across countries, the impact of fiscal stimulus may be weaker at the state 
level than the national level. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
This paper provides a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of 
government spending on the private sector.  Using changes in congressional committee 
chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures, we 
find that fiscal spending shocks appear to significantly dampen corporate sector 
investment activity.  Specifically, we find statistically and economically significant 
evidence that firms respond to government spending shocks by: i.) reducing investments 
in new capital, ii.) reducing investments in R&D, and iii.) paying out more to 
shareholders in the face of this reduced investment opportunity set.  Further, we find 
that when the spending shocks reverse (through a relinquishing of chairmanship), most all 
of these behaviors reverse.  Finally, we also find some evidence that firms scale back their 
employment, and experience a decline in sales growth. 
Our findings demonstrate that new considerations — quite apart from the standard 
interest rate and tax channels — may limit the stimulative capabilities of government 
spending.  Whether they are sufficient to lower the multiplier on fiscal stimulus in a large 
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Figure I: Earmarks in Alabama vs. Rest of US 
This figure shows the annual earmarks (in millions of dollars) for the state of Alabama and for the average state in the 












1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Alabama Rest of US
Shelby
Appointment 
Post-Appt  Pre-Appt 
  Alabama  Rest of US  (AL - US) 
Before Appt  $ 47.1 mil  $ 52.8 mil  $ - 5.7 mil 
After Appt  $ 238.5 mil  $ 145.1 mil  $ 93.4 mil  
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample.  Seniority shocks are defined as follows: Shock Top1ChairOnly is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the senator (or representative) of a given state becomes chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee (the House Ways and Means Committee); Shock Top1Chair&Rank is equal to 1 if a senator becomes either 
chairman or the ranking minority member of the committee. The list of the top 10 most influential committees is from 
Edwards and Stewart (2006); for the Senate these committees are Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, Rules, 
Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce, and for the House these committees 
are Ways and Means, Appropriations, Energy and Commerce, Rules, International Relations, Armed Services, 
Intelligence, Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Transportation and Infrastructure.  Seniority shocks begin in  the year 
on appointment, and are applied for 6 years.  All accounting variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of 




Panel A: Firm-Level Annual Variables  Years 1967-2008, Firms = 16,734 
  Mean Median  Standard  Deviation  Nonmissing 
Observations
Capital Expenditures/Assets-1  0.078 0.048 0.108 168,975
Total Payout/Assets-1  0.023 0.006 0.044 154,832
R&D/Assets-1  0.078 0.028 0.134 86,870
ChgEmployees  0.085 0.026 0.322 158,230
Cash Flow/Assets-1  0.036 0.084 0.242 151,482
Leverage-1  0.416 0.399 0.261 159,833
Tobin's Q-1  1.822 1.230 1.826 153,348
Assets ($m)  2,059 101 23,727  168,970
SalesGrowth 0.180 0.101 0.451  167,000
Shock_Top1ChairOnly  0.030 0 0.171 168,975
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank  0.032 0 0.177 168,975
Shock_Top3ChairOnly  0.044 0 0.204 168,975
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank  0.070 0 0.255 168,975
Shock_Top5ChairOnly  0.062 0 0.242 168,975
Shock_Top5Chair&Rank  0.118 0 0.322 168,975
Shock_Top10ChairOnly  0.098 0 0.297 168,975
Shock_Top10Chair&Rank  0.196 0 0.397 168,975
Drop_Top1ChairOnly  0.019 0 0.136 168,975
Drop_Top3ChairOnly  0.022 0 0.146 168,975
Shock_Top1ChairOnly (House)  0.037 0 0.188 168,975
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank (House)  0.100 0 0.300 168,975
Shock_Top3ChairOnly (House)  0.074 0 0.261 168,975
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank (House)  0.207 0 0.405  168,975
Shock_Top5ChairOnly (House)  0.113 0 0.317  168,975
Shock_Top10ChairOnly (House)  0.180 0 0.384 168,975
   
Panel B: State-Level Annual Variables  Years=1991-2008, States=50  
  Mean Median  Standard  Deviation  Nonmissing 
Observations
Total Earmarks (in dollars)  115,513,520 71,513,333 126,226,177  889
Ln(Total Earmarks)  17.94 18.09 1.30  889
State Population  5,327,111 3,665,228 5,811,533  889
Ln(State Population)  15.00 15.11 1.01  889
State Area (in square miles) 72,694 56,276 87,559  889
Total State Govt. Transfers (in millions)  3,009.1 1,834.6 3,795.6  800
Log(Total State Govt. Transfers)  21.37 21.33 0.91  695
    
 


























Panel C:   Top 10 Chairman/Ranking Member Characteristics, 1967-2008
  All Chair/Rank  High Inc. 
States 
Low Inc. 
States  Democrat Republican
  Mean Median  Std 
Dev  Max Mean Mean  Mean Mean 
 





6 5.7  24  5.9  9.0 
 
9.1 6.7 


























6 4.3  18  5.7  7.2 
 
6.7 5.8 



















Table II: Average Annual Earmarks By State  
 
This table reports average annual earmarks by state, for the period 1991-2008.  Earmark figures are in dollars.   
Population figures for each state are obtained from the 1990 and 2000 census.  Total firms, average number of firms per 
year, average total capital expenditures per year (in millions of $), and average total corporate employees per year (in 
thousands), are from Compustat and are yearly averages by state over the full sample period (1967-2008). The shock 
variables are for the Shock Top3Chair&Rank specification, and are averages by state over the full sample period (1967-




















1 CA  396,558,675  31,815,835 1 12.5 3111 651.4 30,203.1 2,445.6  0 0.3571
2 HI  268,747,947  1,159,883 41 231.7 25 8.5 315.1  21.1  0.0976 0
3 TX  264,019,500  18,919,165 2 14.0 1643 402.9 49,725.8 2,303.5 0.1429 0.3095
4 MS  251,435,028  2,708,937 31 92.8 58 12.3 225.6 20.0  0.2381 0.2857
5 AK  250,423,299  588,488 48 425.5 8 1.7 64.7  2.3  0.4103 0
6 NY  235,944,300  18,483,456 3 12.8 1872 472.1 35,372.0 3,525.9 0.1429 0.4286
7 FL  211,345,224  14,460,152 4 14.6 936 204.1 6,734.6  707.8  0.1429 0.2381
8 PA  196,825,967  12,081,349 5 16.3 675 192.7 9,910.9 1,192.7 0.2857 0.2857
9 WV  190,458,702  1,800,911 35 105.8 27 6.0 104.4  9.2  0.2439 0
10 AL  164,896,228  4,243,844 23 38.9 92 24.9 907.1  93.9  0.1429 0
11 WA  162,261,711  5,380,407 15 30.2 286 62.6 3,960.9  285.5  0.1429 0
12 VA  145,416,729  6,632,937 12 21.9 428 103.8 10,228.9  779.9  0 0.1429
13 MO  144,746,031  5,356,142 16 27.0 232 70.3 4,820.3  670.2  0 0
14  IL 143,113,080  11,924,948 6 12.0 728 208.5 22,001.6 2,837.9  0 0.2857
15  OH 132,808,519  11,100,128 7 12.0 521 169.3 11,286.5 1,804.9  0 0.0238
16 MD  131,723,944  5,038,977 19 26.1 343 79.3 2,798.3  480.8  0 0
17 KY  127,681,908  3,863,533 24 33.0 92 23.9 1,134.2  213.5  0 0.1429
18 LA  126,312,872  4,344,475 22 29.1 99 27.4 2,365.0  75.2  0.1463 0.3415
19  NJ 121,137,029  8,072,269 9 15.0 916 233.1 17,831.6 1,618.6 0.1429 0
20 SC  113,031,906  3,749,358 26 30.1 102 24.0 864.0  157.2  0 0
21 GA  108,417,567  7,332,335 11 14.8 465 108.2 9,955.6  742.6  0.1429 0
22 NM  107,467,034  1,667,058 36 64.5 42 7.9 237.1  8.3  0 0
23 MI  95,786,036  9,616,871 8 10.0 315 100.3 22,781.2  2,104.6  0 0.2857
24 NC  95,052,529  7,338,975 10 13.0 305 81.3 5,411.0  593.3  0.0238 0.1429
25 AZ  91,161,492  4,354,830 21 20.9 243 55.5 2,178.8  163.2  0 0
26 NV  89,351,668  1,600,045 38 55.8 156 34.2 2,381.6  107.0  0 0
27 MA  89,040,991  6,182,761 13 14.4 889 210.4 4,754.6 680.6  0 0.1429
28 TN  87,197,317  5,283,234 17 16.5 214 57.4 3,911.6  563.0  0 0.2857
29 CO  85,496,729  3,797,828 25 22.5 645 120.3 7,005.7  246.2  0 0
30 IA  84,135,999  2,851,540 30 29.5 90 25.8 694.7  66.4  0.1429 0
31 OR  80,414,090  3,131,860 29 25.7 151 40.2 1,393.0  114.0  0.2381 0.1429
32 IN  78,905,946  5,812,322 14 13.6 204 56.3 2,204.4  215.5  0 0.1429
33 WI  74,415,071  5,127,722 18 14.5 175 60.6 2,521.2  447.8  0.1429 0.1429
34 OK  73,020,270  3,289,147 28 22.2 214 41.1 5,175.7  60.6  0 0
35 AR  66,932,573  2,502,572 33 26.7 46 16.5 4,961.0  726.6  0.1429 0
36 UT  66,347,652  1,963,000 34 33.8 150 30.8 925.5  112.3  0.1429 0
65 MN  65,542,312  4,647,289 20 14.1 481 134.9 6,317.4  843.5  0 0
38 MT  62,379,300  850,630 44 73.3 16 3.8 153.2  3.9  0.1463 0
39 KS  61,882,552  2,582,996 32 24.0 120 29.5 2,495.7  137.8  0.1429 0
40 NH  55,522,703  1,176,241 40 47.2 78 19.8 271.7  41.4  0 0
41 CT  49,517,958  3,346,341 27 14.8 471 131.9 11,005.5 1,135.5  0 0
42 ID  48,961,253  1,150,351 42 42.6 36 10.5 1,084.1  99.0  0.0952 0
43 ND  43,764,173  640,500 47 68.3 9 1.1 164.6  4.6  0 0
44 SD  42,993,348  725,424 46 59.3 17 5.3 193.2  16.5  0 0
45 ME  34,919,217  1,250,043 39 27.9 29 8.9 361.9  20.5  0 0
46 VT  31,836,241  585,793 49 54.3 18 5.6 75.6  4.0  0.1463 0
47 RI  30,788,275  1,024,572 43 30.0 50 14.5 825.5  174.0  0 0
48 NE  25,319,431  1,644,824 37 15.4 56 13.6 2,040.7  164.7  0.1463 0
49 DE  18,704,944  728,338 45 25.7 55 14.9 785.6  191.6  0.1429 0





Table III: The Impact of Seniority Shocks on State-Level Earmarks, 1991-2008 
 
This table reports panel regressions of earmarks on Senate seniority shocks (defined as in Table I).  Year-fixed effects and state-fixed effects are included where indicated.  
All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates.  The dependent variable is ln(state-level annual earmarks).  Control variables include ln(state-level population), the state-level average of ln(per capita income) 
over the past 6 years, and lagged values of state-level ln(per-capita income growth) and state-level unemployment rates.  ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; 
*significant at 10%.  
 
  Dependent Variable: Ln(State-Level Earmarks) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)
   
Shock_Top1ChairOnly 0.446*** 0.481***  
  (9.42)  (8.77)            
Shock_ Top3ChairOnly  0.451***  
      (3.30)          
Shock_Top5ChairOnly 0.426***  
      (3.67)         
   
Shock_Top10ChairOnly 0.224** 
       (2.49)       
   
Shock_Top1Chair&Ramk   0.330***
    (3.30)  
Shock_ Top3Chair&Ramk    0.265***
            (3.12)    
Shock_Top5Chair&Ramk   0.205***
              (2.76)   
Shock_Top10Chair&Ramk   0.164**
                (2.35) 






















2  0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
No. of Obs.  889 839 839 839 839  839 839 839 839
   
 
 
Table IV: The Impact of Seniority Shocks on Corporate Investment, 1967-2008 
 
This table reports panel regressions of capital expenditures on Senate seniority shocks (defined as in Table I).  All models contain firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects. 
All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state and year level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates.  ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
    Dependent Variable: Capital Expendituresi,t/Ai,t-1 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)
Shock_Top1ChairOnly -0.012***  -0.009***  
  (3.46)  (3.14)         
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank   -0.008***  
     ( 2 . 9 4 )         
Shock_Top3ChairOnly      -0.006***  
        (2.78)       
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank      -0.006*** 
          (3.57)      
Shock_Top5ChairOnly        -0.005***    
         (2.64)     
Shock_Top10ChairOnly       -0.003*
            (1.95)    
Drop_Top1ChairOnly       0.007**
        (2.22)
Drop_Top3ChairOnly       0.006**
              ( 2 . 1 1 )  
Qi,t-1   0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
    (12.33) (12.33) (12.32) (12.34) (12.29) (12.33) (12.33) (12.32) 
(Cash Flowi,t/Ai,t-1)   0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***  0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
    (9.40) (9.40) (9.40) (9.40) (9.41) (9.40) (9.40) (9.40) 
Leveragei,t-1   -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116***  -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.117***
    (31.54) (31.53) (31.51) (31.50) (31.46) (31.54) (31.42) (31.41) 
Adjusted R
2  0.440 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501
No. of Obs.  168975  139564 139564 139564 139564  139564 139564 139563 139563
       
 
 
Table V: House Shocks, Committee Chair Instrument, and Alternative Specifications 
 
This table reports panel regressions of capital expenditures on House seniority shocks (from 1967-2008), earmarks directly (1991-2008), IV predicted values of 
earmarks (1991-2008), randomly assigned shocks, and various subsamples.  Panel A presents the results for the House seniority shocks.  In Panel B, the IV 
predicted value comes from a first stage that regresses Shock Top3ChairOnly (Senate Shock) on ln(earmarks), as in Table III.  The second to last row of Panel B 
includes only stocks above the median lagged market capitalization in a given year in the regressions; the final row excludes all shocks where the prior chairman 
lost his chair because he/she was defeated in an election/primary.  All models contain firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, and controls for lagged Q, cash flow, 
and lagged leverage defined as in Table IV are included when indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state and yearl, and t-stats using 




Panel A: House Shocks    Dependent Variable: Capital Expendituresi,t/Ai,t-1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Shock_Top1ChairOnly -0.006** -0.004**  
  (2.51)  (2.26)          
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank -0.005***  
     (3.81)         
Shock_Top3ChairOnly      -0.001  
        (0.90)        
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank      -0.003***
         (2.74)        
Shock_Top5ChairOnly        -0.002*     
          (1.93)      
Shock_Top10ChairOnly       -0.002***
            (2.65)     
Drop_Top1ChairOnly       0.006*
        (1.66)
Drop_Top3ChairOnly       0.001
              (0.23) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2  0.439 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.501
No. of Obs.  168977 139564 139564 139564 139564 139564 139564 139562 139562





































Panel B: Alternative  
Specifications and Subsamples  
Dependent Variable: Capital Expendituresi,t/Ai,t-1 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Ln(Annual Earmarks)  0.000   
     (1991-2008)  (0.55)  
IV Predicted Value  -0.012**   
     (1991-2008)  (2.26)  
Random Shock  -0.000 








    (No Lost Elections)   (3.44) 
Adjusted R
2  0.510 0.510 0.501 0.611 0.501
No. of Obs.  88828 88828 139564  68277 139564 
 
 
Table VI: The Impact of Seniority Shocks on R&D and Payouts, 1967-2008 
 
This table reports panel regressions of firm research and development (R&D) and payouts (cash dividends plus repurchases) on seniority shocks.  Panel A reports results 
with firm-level R&D as the dependent variable, and Panel B reports results with firm-level payouts (cash dividends plus repurchases) as the dependent variable.  All 
models contain firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, and include controls for lagged Q, cash flow, and lagged leverage as in Table IV.  All standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the state and year level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  ***Significant at 
1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.  
Panel A: R&D  Dependent Variable: R&Di,t/Ai,t-1 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Shock_Top1ChairOnly -0.005***
  (2.64)                
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank   -0.003**
   (1.98)                
Shock_Top3ChairOnly    -0.004***
     (2.63)             
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank      -0.003***
        (3.04)            
Drop_Top1ChairOnly       0.009***       
        (3.72)        
Drop_Top3ChairOnly      0.005**
           (2.13)         
Shock_Top1ChairOnly      -0.009***
    (House Shock)      (3.31)
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank      -0.005***
    (House Shock)      (3.54)
Shock_Top3ChairOnly      -0.005***
    (House Shock)      (2.61)
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank      -0.001
    (House Shock)                   (1.28) 
Adjusted R
2  0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782  0.782 0.783 0.783 0.782 0.782
No. of Obs.  74842  74842 74842 74842 74842  74842 74841 74841 74841 74841





Panel B: Payouts  Dependent Variable: Total Payouti,t/Ai,t-1 
 (1)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (11) (11)
Shock_Top1ChairOnly 0.003***
  (4.15)                
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank   0.002***
    (3.70)               
Shock_Top3ChairOnly    0.002***
     (4.23)            
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank      0.001***
        (2.85)            
Drop_Top1ChairOnly       -0.001*        
        (1.71)          
Drop_Top3ChairOnly      -0.001
           (1.44)        
Shock_Top1ChairOnly      0.001
    (House Shock)      (0.84)
Shock_Top1Chair&Rank      0.001**
    (House Shock)      (2.51)
Shock_Top3ChairOnly      0.002***
    (House Shock)      (3.14)
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank      0.001***
    (House Shock)                  (3.59) 
Adjusted R
2  0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392  0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392
No. of Obs.  129991 129991 129991 129991 129990  129990 129990 129990 129990 129990
         
 
Table VII: Other Firm-Level Variables: Employment and Sales Growth, 1967-2008 
 
This table reports panel regressions of seniority shocks on firm-level changes in employment and firm-level sales growth.  Panel A reports results with firm-level changes 
in employment as the dependent variable, and Panel B reports results with firm-level changes in sales as the dependent variable  All models contain firm-fixed effects and 
year-fixed effects.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state and year level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses 








Panel A: ChgEmployees  Dependent Variable:  (Employi,t- Employi,t-1)/ Employi,t-1 
  Full Sample (1967-2008)  Post-1989
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)
Shock_Top1ChairOnly -0.009  
  (1.11)               
Shock_Top3ChairOnly -0.006  
   (1.05)              
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank    -0.011**  -0.017**
     (2.41)        (2.41)   
Shock_Top1ChairOnly      -0.027*  
    (House Shock)      (1.81)  
Shock_Top3ChairOnly      -0.021**
    (House Shock)      (2.32) 
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank       -0.013*** -0.024***
    (House Shock)           (2.97)      (3.12) 
   
Adjusted R
2  0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.139 0.139
No. of Obs.  168267 168267 168267 168265 168265  168265 94182 94182













Panel B: SalesGrowth  Dependent Variable:  (Salesi,t- Salesi,t-1)/ Salesi,t-1 
  Full Sample (1967-2008) Post-1989
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)
Shock_Top1ChairOnly -0.015  
  (1.30)               
Shock_Top3ChairOnly -0.009  
    (1.04)             
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank    -0.014**  -0.026***
     (2.31)        (2.72)   
Shock_Top1ChairOnly      -0.054**  
    (House Shock)      (2.09)  
Shock_Top3ChairOnly      -0.036**
    (House Shock)      (2.39) 
Shock_Top3Chair&Rank       -0.024*** -0.039***
    (House Shock)           (3.49)      (3.46) 
   
Adjusted R
2  0.181 0.181 0.181 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.186 0.186
No. of Obs.  181489 181489 181489 181487 181487  181487 101354 101353
                   
 
Table VIII: Mechanism 
 
This table reports panel regressions of a number of dependent variables on US Senate seniority shocks (defined as in Table 
I).  In the first column, the dependent variable is ln(total state-level federal government transfers) from the Census Bureau, 
excluding category B79 (which consists of nondiscretionary spending on public welfare items, e.g., Medicaid).  These 
regressions are run at the state level as in Table III.  The model contains both state-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  In columns 2-4, the dependent variables are Capex, Employ, and Capex, 
respectively, and these regressions are run at the firm level.  The specifications and variable definitions are the same as in 
Tables IV and VII; e.g., Capex is firm level capital expenditures divided by lagged assets, and Employ is the change in 
number of employees.  Low Utilization is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm in question is below the median in terms 
of its capacity utilization rate.  High Unemployment is a dummy equal to one if the difference between the state-level 
unemployment rate (in the state the firm is headquartered in) and the national unemployment rate is greater than its 
historical difference.  Had Contract is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm in question received a government contract 
in the past. The models in columns 2-4 contain both firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the state and year level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the 






Federal Transfers, Factor Slack, and Procurement Contracts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Transfers Capex Employ  Capex 
   
Shock_Top1ChairOnly  0.094*** -0.021*** -0.016**  -0.010*** 
(Sample Period: 1992-2007)  (2.85)  (3.93)  (2.27)  (6.27) 
Shock_Top1ChairOnly*Low Util 0.009**  
(Sample Period: 1980-2008)  (2.06)     
Shock_Top1ChairOnly*High Unemp 0.024**   
(Sample Period: 1977-2008)    (2.17)   
Shock_Top1ChairOnly*Had Contract 0.009***   
(Sample Period: 1984-2008)      (3.12)     
Low Utilization  -0.006***  
(Sample Period: 1980-2008)  (6.03)    
High Unemployment  -0.008**   
(Sample Period: 1977-2008)   (2.40)  
Had Contract  -0.007***  
(Sample Period: 1984-2008)      (6.28)     
Fixed Effects  Year Year Year  Year 
Fixed Effects  State Firm Firm  Firm 
Adjusted R
2  0.981 0.500 0.130 0.577 
No. of Obs.  800 49520 147886  97037  
 
Table IX: Breadth, Scope, and Timing of Corporate Response to Seniority Shocks, 1967-2008 
 
Panel A reports results for state-level regressions of various corporate response variables on senate seniority shocks, with firm and year fixed effects included; the 
Shock_Top10Chair&Rank variable is used as the independent variable here in order to maximize the number of states receiving a shock. Regression coefficients are 
averaged (equally) across the 48 states that have experienced such a shock, and t-stats computed using the standard-deviation of these coefficients across states are 
reported here. The %States Predicted Sign also shows significance level (in *) of a binomial test whether the state with the predicted sign is greater than a null of 0.5.  In 
Panels B and C, the shock variable used is Shock_Top3Chair&Rank; Panel B provides simple firm-level averages of corporate responses by type of firm, broken down by 
domestic-only firms versus global firms (classified using Compustat segment data, available since 1979); and Panel C provides simple firm-level averages for different 
response periods (1 year, out to 6 years), as well as regression coefficients from firm-level regressions similar to those in Tables IV-VII but which also include a variable 









  Panel A: State-Level Cross-Sectional Average Regression Coefficients (Shock_Top10Chair&Rank) 




Individual States with Predicted Sign Coefficient 
Capital 
Expendituresi,t/Ai,t-1   -0.026***  3.48  73.9%***  AK,AL,AZ,CO,CT,FL,GA,HI,IL,KS,MA,MD,MI,MO,MS,MT,ND,NE,NY,NJ,NV,NY,OK,
OR,PA,RI,SC,TN,TX,UT,VA,WA,WI,WY 
R&Di,t/Ai,t-1   -0.003  -0.51  53.3%  AZ,CA,FL,GA,HI,ID,IL,IN,KS,KY,LA,MD,MT,ND,NH,NJ,NM,NY,OR,PA,SC,SD,TX,WA 
 
Total Payouti,t/Ai,t-1     0.004**  1.98  67.4%***  AK,AL,AZ,CO,CT,FL,IL,IN,KY,LA,MA,MO,MS,ND,NE,NH,NJ,NM,NV,NY,OK,OR,PA,
RI,SC,TN,TX,UT,VT,WA,WI 
ChgEmployees   -0.091***  4.58  82.6%***  AK,AR,AZ,CA,CO,CT,FL,GA,HI,IA,IL,KS,KY,MA,MD,MI,MO,MS,MT,NC,NE,NH,NJ, 
NV,NY,OK,OR,PA,RI,SD,TN,TX,UT,VA,WA,WI,WV,WY 
SalesGrowth   -0.130***  4.81  78.3%***  AK,AL,AZ,CO,CT,FL,GA,Hi,IA,ID,IL,KS,KY,LA,MA,MD,MI,MO,MS,MT,NC,NE,NH,NJ, 
NY,OK,OR,PA,RI,SC,TN,TX,UT,VA,WA,WY 
        






Panel B: Firm Level Averages of Corporate Responses for Domestic-Only and Global Firms  
(Classified Using Compustat Segments, Data Available 1979-2007 Only) 
  All Firms Domestic-Only Firms    Global Firms 
Variable:  Shock No Shock Diff.    Shock No Shock Diff Shock No Shock Diff
Capital Expendituresi,t/Ai,t-1 0.067 0.077 (0.010) 0.067 0.080  (0.013) 0.067 0.070 (0.003)
R&Di,t/Ai,t-1  0.064 0.089  (0.025)    0.066 0.091  (0.025)    0.060 0.085  (0.025) 
Total Payouti,t/Ai,t-1  0.025  0.024  0.001  0.024  0.022  0.002  0.026  0.029  (0.003) 
ChgEmployees  0.085 0.089  (0.004)    0.089 0.095  (0.006)    0.075 0.075  (0.000) 
SalesGrowth  0.160 0.185  (0.025)    0.168 0.198  (0.030)    0.133 0.152  (0.019) 
  






  No Shock  Year1  Year2-6  All Shock    Shock  Pre-Shock 
Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Expendituresi,t/Ai,t-1 0.079 0.070 0.069 0.069 -0.009*** 0.001
  (5.75) (0.37)
R&Di,t/Ai,t-1 0.079 0.062 0.059 0.060 -0.003*** 0.000
  (2.82) (0.12)
Total Payouti,t/Ai,t-1 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.000
  (1.36) (0.34)
ChgEmployees 0.085 0.085 0.080 0.081 -0.011*** 0.000
  (2.67) (0.01)
SalesGrowth 0.179 0.157 0.156 0.156 -0.017***  -0.001 
  (3.11) (0.17)
   